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WASHINGTON'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
EXCEPTION TO THE PUBLIC
DUTY DOCTRINE
Abstract: The public duty doctrine states that in order for a person to recover tort
damages from a governmental entity, the individual must prove that the governmental
entity breached a duty owed to him or her particularly, and not just a breach of a duty
owed to the public. The "special relationship" exception to the doctrine provides a mech-
anism for proving a particularized duty. The Washington Supreme Court has now
restricted this exception. By restricting the exception, the court may inappropriately bar
certain injured plaintiffs from recovery. The restriction may also violate Washington stat-
utes abrogating governmental immunity by giving government defendants treatment not
afforded private defendants. This Comment analyzes the new exception in light of a tradi-
tional tort duty analysis. The Comment concludes that a traditional tort duty analysis
provides a better framework for assessing governmental duty in negligence actions.
The public duty doctrine originated as a principle for limiting the
potentially widespread tort liability of governmental entities that fol-
lowed the abolition of governmental tort immunity.I Under the public
duty doctrine, governmental entities owe the public a general duty to
perform their offices, but a particularized duty to no one person.2  A
governmental entity cannot be liable to a private party for failure to
per orm duties owed solely to the general public. Exceptions to the
public duty doctrine recognize affirmative duties to certain persons,
preventing the doctrine from granting complete governmental
immunity.
The "special relationship" exception allows tort actions for negli-
gent performance of public duties if the plaintiff can prove circum-
stances setting his or her relationship with the government apart from
that of the general public.3 The scope of this exception has been a
subject of continuing litigation in Washington.
In 1988 the Washington Supreme Court decided three cases, Taylor
v. Stevens County,4 Honcoop v. State,' and Meaney v. Dodd,6 which
modified the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine.
These decisions curtailed the court's previous expansion of govern-
1. "Governmental entity" refers to both state and municipal governments.
2. The public duty doctrine appeared in the United States as early as 1856. South v.
Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1856) (sheriff not liable for standing by while plaintiff was
robbed).
3. Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 166, 759 P.2d 447, 451 (1988).
4. 111 Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).
5. 111 Wash. 2d 182, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988).
6. 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988).
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mental liability in J & B Development v. King County.7 In J & B
Development, the court stated that a special relationship existed if
there was direct contact between the government and the plaintiff,
implicit assurances by the government, and justifiable reliance on the
assurances by the plaintiff.8 The recent cases reject liability based on
implicit assurances, and create a new rule: governmental tort duty is
now limited to situations involving direct contact, explicit assurances,
and justifiable reliance.'
This Comment considers the new rule's effects on persons injured by
governmental negligence, and compares the results to those reached
under a traditional tort duty analysis. The Comment concludes that a
limited group of policy considerations motivated the court to restrict
the special relationship rule. In cases outside the scope of these poli-
cies, the new rule may unduly restrict liability. In addition, the restric-
tion of governmental liability under the new rule arguably violates
Washington statutes abrogating governmental immunity. This Com-
ment argues that problems inherent in the public duty doctrine and
the special relationship exception could be alleviated by substituting a
traditional tort duty analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Origins and Development of the Public Duty Doctrine
Governmental tort immunity prevailed in Washington until 1961.10
Governmental immunity did not negate the existence of a tort duty;
rather, it barred recovery for a breach of that duty.1 The Washington
7. 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983), overruled in Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash.
2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988) and Meaney v. Dodd, 11I Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988).
8. J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 306-07, 669 P.2d at 472-73.
9. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 166, 759 P.2d at 451; Honcoop, 11 Wash. 2d at 191-92, 759 P.2d
at 1194; Meaney, Ill Wash. 2d at 180, 759 P.2d at 457.
10. Governmental immunity developed from the English doctrine of sovereign immunity
which states that "the King can do no wrong" and liability will not attach despite damage
resulting from the King's tortious behavior. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 25.01, at 436 (1958) (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (10th ed. 1887)). The
doctrine was first introduced in the United States in 1812 and was soon adopted in most states.
Comment, Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National
Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537, 538 (1983). Governmental immunity has now been abolished in
most states. See id. at 540.
11. According to the Washington Supreme Court:
[T]he 'public duty doctrine' recognizes the existence of a tort, authorizes the filing of a claim
against a municipality and also recognizes applicable liability subject to some limitations.
The concept of 'sovereign immunity,' while recognizing the existence of a tort, denies all
liability within the limits of the immunity.
J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 303, 669 P.2d at 471.
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legislature abolished state governmental immunity in 1961.12 The leg-
islature abolished governmental immunity for political subdivisions of
the state in 1967.13 The Washington statutes render the state and its
subdivisions liable for their tortious acts to the same extent that a pri-
vate person or corporation would be liable. 14 Thus, the statutes do not
create any new causes of action.1 5
Governinents sometimes perform unique functions not seen in the
private sector. 16 As a result, the Washington statutes may be ambigu-
ous about what tort duty the government would owe if it were a pri-
vate person. A governmental entity owes a general duty to all persons
to perform its offices. The Washington Supreme Court has used the
public duty doctrine as a tool for determining whether a governmental
entity owes a person an actionable duty distinct from the general
duty. 17 In addition to the above functional purpose of the public duty
doctrine, the Washington Supreme Court has also cited two more
traditional justifications. 8 First, the doctrine protects state resources
from tort damage awards. 9 Second, the public duty doctrine, like
governmental immunity, allows government officials to act without
fear of liability.20
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1987) provides: "The state of Washington, whether acting
in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious
conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation."
13. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (1987) provides in part:
All political subdivisions, municipal corporations, and quasi municipal corporations of
the state, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for
damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their officers, agents
or employees to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.
14. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 (1987).
15. Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 226, 595 P.2d 534, 539 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S.
1077 (1980); see also J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 305, 669 P.2d at 472.
16. An example of a unique governmental function not provided by the private sector is the
granting of building permits. "IT]e County is the only governmental body empowered to grant
or deny building permits." J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 306, 669 P.2d at 473.
17. Id at 304-05, 669 P.2d at 472; see also Comment, A Unified Approach to State and
Municipal Tort Liability in Washington, 59 WAsH. L. REv. 533, 542 (1984).
18. J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 304-05, 669 P.2d at 472.
19. This justification for the public duty doctrine may violate Washington statutes abolishing
governmental immunity. These statutes require that liability be imposed upon a negligent
governmental entity as if it were "a private person or corporation." WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 (1987). A private defendant's ability to pay is not a legally recognized
factor in a private negligence suit. Therefore, this justification violates statutory law by giving
the government special treatment not afforded private defendants. See generally, Note, State
Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 344-46 (1977).
20. One commentator has argued that this justification is unpersuasive and actually supports
unlimited governmental liability:
The government should consider whether the benefits of the government program
outweigh its total costs, including the cost of potential tort liability. If the cost of tort
403
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A person who brings a tort action against a governmental entity
must be able to prove that he or she falls within an exception to the
public duty doctrine.21 The Washington Supreme Court has recog-
nized four exceptions under which governmental entities owe particu-
larized duties to individuals.22 Prior to Taylor v. Stevens County,23
Honcoop v. State,24 and Meaney v. Dodd,2" these exceptions were a
means of avoiding the potentially harsh results of the public duty doc-
trine.26 The exceptions had almost entirely consumed the public duty
doctrine, so that the doctrine seldom barred recovery against a govern-
mental entity.27
liability is not taken into account, then the government may undertake programs in which
the actual cost to the public outweighs the benefits derived.
Comment, supra note 17, at 542-43.
21. The public duty doctrine differs from discretionary immunity, another doctrine frequently
relied upon by governmental entities to avoid tort liability. Discretionary immunity shields
governmental entities from tort liability stemming from basic policy-making decisions and is an
exception to Washington's waiver of governmental immunity. See King v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d
239, 246, 525 P.2d 228, 231-33 (1974); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.
2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1965); Comment, supra note 17, at 533-37.
22. The four exceptions are: Clear legislative intent; failure to enforce; rescue doctrine; and
special relationship. See generally Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 268, 737 P.2d
1257, 1260 (1987).
The "clear legislative intent" and "failure to enforce" exceptions impose a particularized duty
required by statute. Under the "clear legislative intent" exception, a governmental entity owes a
particularized duty to a plaintiff who is a member of a class protected by statute. Halvorson v.
Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1978) (plaintiff's decedent who was killed in a
hotel fire was within the clear legislative intent exception because housing code expressly
protected building occupants).
Under the "failure to enforce" exception a government agent responsible for enforcing a
statute intended to protect a class, of which the plaintiff is a member, owes a duty to the plaintiff
to enforce the statute. Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 325-26, 534 P.2d 1360, 1362-64
(1975).
The "rescue doctrine" states that a governmental entity must use reasonable care after
warning or coming to the aid of a person. Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 293, 299,
545 P.2d 13, 18 (1975). The duty is based on the tort principle that a defendant who has
promised to warn or rescue a plaintiff induces detrimental reliance on the part of the plaintiff,
causing the plaintiff to worsen his or her situation by not seeking help elsewhere. RESTATEMEN-r
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965).
Under the "special relationship" exception, a governmental duty results from a more extensive
relationship with a particular individual than with other members of the general public. See
infra text accompanying notes 28-42.
23. 111 Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).
24. 111 Wash. 2d 182, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988).
25. 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988).
26. Bailey, 108 Wash. 2d at 267, 737 P.2d at 1259.
27. "We have almost universally found it unnecessary to invoke the public duty doctrine to
bar a plaintiff's lawsuit." Id. at 266, 737 P.2d at 1259; see also, Note, Municipal Liability, 19
GONz. L. REV. 727, 730 (1983/84).
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B. Development of the Special Relationship Exception
Taylor,28 Honcoop,29 and Meaney 3° have significantly altered the
public duty doctrine by narrowing the special relationship exception to
the public duty doctrine. Governmental liability in J & B Development
was based, in part, on the government's implicit assurances that the
plaintiff had complied with building codes.31 In J & B Development,
assurances were inferred from the government's building inspection
and issuance of a building permit.32 Taylor and Meaney overruled
J & B Development. 33 Taylor, Honcoop, and Meaney all hold that the
special relationship exception requires express, not implied, assurances
from the government.34
L Pre-1988 Special Relationship Rule
J & B Development imposed a significant risk of liability on govern-
mental entities by holding that a "special relationship" was created
when there was direct contact between the plaintiff and the govern-
mental entity, and the plaintiff justifiably relied upon assurances which
the governmental entity had made to him or her.3 1 In J & B Develop-
ment, King County issued a building permit to a developer.36 The
approving official and a later inspection failed to detect that the build-
ing plans did not comply with county setback requirements. 37 The
county later suspended the developer's building permit after it was dis-
covered that the building violated county setback requirements.38
The court found a special relationship between the developer and
the county. The direct contact requirement was met because the
developer "dealt directly with the County through its agents."' 39 In
addition, the developer had justifiably relied on assurances implied
through the issuance of a building permit and a successful building
inspection.4' The court reasoned that permit and inspection require-
28. Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).
29. Honcoop v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 182, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988).
30. Meaney v. Dodd, I11 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988).
31. J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 306-07, 669 P.2d 468, 472-73 (1983).
32. Id.
33. Taylor, 11 Wash. 2d at 168, 759 P.2d at 452; Meaney, 111 Wash. 2d at 180, 759 P.2d at
458.
34. Honcoop, 111 Wash. 2d at 191-92, 759 P.2d at 1194 (citing the new rule stated by Taylor
and Meaney).
35. J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 306-07, 669 P.2d at 472-73.
36. Id. at 301, 669 P.2d at 470.
37. Id. at 301-02, 669 P.2d at 470-71.
38. Id. at 302, 669 P.2d at 471.
39. Id. at 307, 669 P.2d at 473.
40. Id. at 306-07, 669 P.2d at 472-73.
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ments created both a general duty of care to the public and a particu-
larized duty of care to builders.4"
2. New Special Relationship Rule
In contrast to the special relationship rule provided in J & B Devel-
opment, the new rule, as stated in Taylor, Honcoop, and Meaney,
applies the exception only when there is direct contact between the
injured plaintiff and the governmental entity, and the plaintiff justifia-
bly relies on express, not implied, assurances from the governmental
entity.42
C. Facts of Taylor, Honcoop, and Meaney
1. Taylor v. Stevens County
In Taylor v. Stevens County,43 the Washington Supreme Court held
that under the public duty doctrine the county owed no actionable
duty to the plaintiffs, purchasers of a defective house, to issue a valid
building permit.' A county inspector had issued a building permit to
the sellers of the house, despite numerous existing building code viola-
tions.45 The court overruled J & B Development, stating that under
the previous special relationship rule, local governments were vulnera-
ble to unlimited liability.46 According to the court, building inspec-
tions and permits authorize construction, but do not imply that plans
submitted are in compliance with all applicable codes.47
The court cited several policy reasons for imposing the duty of com-
pliance on individuals instead of on governmental entities.48 First, the
41. Id. at 307, 669 P.2d at 473.
42. Under the new rule:
A special relationship triggers an actionable duty where: (1) there is direct contact or privity
between the public official and the injured plaintiff which sets the latter apart from the
general public, and (2) there are express assurances given by a public official, which (3) give
rise to justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.
Honcoop v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 182, 191-92, 759 P.2d 1188, 1194 (1988).
43. 111 Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).
44. Id. at 161, 759 P.2d at 448.
45. Id. at 161-62, 759 P.2d at 448-49.
46. Id. at 170-71, 759 P.2d at 453.
47. "Building permits and building code inspections only authorize construction to proceed;
they do not guarantee that all provisions of all applicable codes have been complied with." Id. at
167, 759 P.2d at 452.
If, as the court asserted, permits do not in fact imply compliance, then the court did not need
to overrule the prior rule because in this case there were no "implied assurances." Taylor, thus,
could have been distinguished from the prior rule on its facts, and it was unnecessary to change
the legal standard.
48. The court actually cited five reasons. Id. at 168-71, 759 P.2d at 452-53. For purposes of
discussion, the reasons have been organized differently here.
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primary purpose of building permits and building code inspections is
to ensure consistent compliance with construction, zoning, and land
use ordinances.49 The approval of construction plans and satisfactory
inspections do not absolve a builder from the legal obligation to com-
ply with statutes.50 Second, as a result of budgetary and personnel
constraints, it is unreasonable to place the burden of compliance on
local governmental entities.51 Third, imposing liability on individuals
for noncompliance with building codes is consistent with the state's
zoning vested rights doctrine.52
The supreme court acknowledged that it was engaged in an analysis
of public policy considerations, previously unexamined in J & B Devel-
opment, when determining the existence of a duty.53 As a matter of
policy, the Washington Supreme Court determined that a governmen-
tal entity responsible for enforcing compliance with building codes
should not be liable for noncompliance with those codes.54
2 Honcoop v. State
In Honcoop v. State,5 dairy operators brought a negligence action
against the State of Washington for losses suffered when their cattle
became infected with brucellosis.56 The plaintiffs asserted that the
director of the state Department of Agriculture had a duty to warn
them of brucellosis in cattle imported from Idaho. The plaintiffs
claimed that this duty was based on the "clear legislative intent,"57
"failure to enforce,"5" and "special relationship" 59 exceptions to the
public duty doctrine.
The court held that the state owed no duty to the plaintiffs under
any of the exceptions, including the special relationship exception. 6'
49. Id at 168-69, 759 P.2d at 452.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 169, 759 P.2d at 452.
52. Id The zoning vested rights doctrine holds that a permit holder's right to develop land is
protected from later zoning changes only if at the time the permit application was granted the
application complied with all zoning and building codes. Apparently the court used this doctrine
for comparative purposes to indicate that no rights accompany a permit unless the holder has
complied with the applicable law. See id
53. Id at 168, 759 P.2d at 452.
54. Id.
55. 111 Wash. 2d 182, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988).
56. d at 184-85, 759 P.2d at 1190-91. "Brucellosis is a highly contagious bacteriological
disease that infects cattle and humans." Id. at 184, 759 P.2d at 1190.
57. Id at 188-89, 759 P.2d at 1192-93.
58. Id at 189-91, 759 P.2d at 1193-94.
59. iZ at 191-93, 759 P.2d at 1194-95.
60. Id at 194, 759 P.2d at 1195-96.
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Although seven of the eight plaintiffs had allegedly been in direct con-
tact with the state, none of the plaintiffs received express assurances
from the state that would, according to the court, give rise to justifi-
able reliance.61
3. Meaney v. Dodd
In Meaney v. Dodd,62 the plaintiff submitted an application to Skagit
County for a sawmill permit. 63 He indicated that the proposed saw-
mill would create a minimal increase in noise. 4 However, he did not
inform the county of the specific level of noise expected. 65 The plain-
tiff constructed the sawmill, but was forced to close operations when it
was discovered that the mill violated county noise regulations.66 He
then sued Skagit County to recover losses incurred by the forced clo-
sure of the mill.67
The Washington Supreme Court held that under the new special
relationship rule stated in Taylor,68 Skagit County was not liable for
two reasons. First, the county did not expressly assure the plaintiff
that the sawmill would comply with noise regulations.69 Second, the
plaintiff's reliance was unjustified because the plaintiff had not
received express assurances. 70 The court stated that a plaintiff's reli-
ance is justifiable only if the government intended the plaintiff to rely
on information produced by the government in response to a "direct
inquiry. 7
1
61. "Mere allegations that the State failed to provide adequate information or that the State
failed to explore every possible risk or contingency is not sufficient to satisfy the assurance prong
of the special relationship test." Id. at 192, 759 P.2d at 1195.
62. 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988).
63. Id. at 175, 759 P.2d at 456.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 176, 759 P.2d at 456.
67. The Washington Court of Appeals had held that the county was liable because the
issuance of a special use permit "inherently implies that the issuing agency has verified that the
proposed use complies with the applicable provisions of the county code." Meaney v. Dodd, 47
Wash. App. 386, 390, 735 P.2d 100, 102 (1987), rev'd, 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988).
68. Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 166, 759 P.2d 447, 451 (1988).
69. "We conclude the County did not give any express assurance that the sawmill would
comply with noise regulations upon which the Dodds could justifiably rely." Meaney, Ill Wash.
2d at 181, 759 P.2d at 458-59.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 180, 759 P.2d at 458.
408
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D. Rationale for New Interpretation of the Special
Relationship Exception
The Washington Supreme Court attempted in Taylor, Honcoop, and
Meaney to prevent state and local governments from being, in effect,
insurers against certain plaintiffs' economic losses.72 J & B Develop-
ment had expanded governmental liability in the area of building
inspections and permits, placing the cost of noncompliance with build-
ing and zoning regulations on governmental entities.73 The court
made a policy decision to narrow the special relationship exception,
placing the burden of noncompliance with regulations on the parties
responsible for complying with the regulations.74
II. ANALYSIS
A. Effect of New Rule on Persons Injured by
Governmental Negligence
An analysis of the new special relationship exception's effect on dif-
ferent types of plaintiffs will provide a framework for discussion of the
new rule. Application of the new rule will be compared with applica-
tion of a traditional tort duty analysis. Results of the rule's applica-
tion will be analyzed in light of underlying policy concerns and
compared with results reached under a traditional tort duty.analysis.
L Homeowners Physically Injured as a Result
of Faulty Construction
A homeowner who is physically injured by faulty construction
approved through a building inspection will not be able to meet the
three elements of the new special relationship rule. As a result, home-
owners probably will be barred from recovery against the governmen-
tal entity that conducted the building inspection. Homeowners often
do not establish "special relationships" with building inspectors within
the meaning of the new rule. A homeowner who does not meet or
speak with a building inspector neither establishes "direct contact"
nor receives "express assurances."75 Because these elements of the
72. "[B]uilding codes are designed to protect the public safety, health and welfare, not to
protect individuals from economic loss caused by public officials while carrying on public
duties." Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 169, 759 P.2d at 452.
73. See id. at 166-68, 759 P.2d at 451-52.
74. See iL at 168-72, 759 P.2d at 452-54.
75. Because Taylor Honcoop, and Meaney narrowed the special relationship exception,
assurances cannot be implied from the fact that a building inspection failed to disclose any
defects. Taylor, I1l Wash. 2d at 167, 759 P.2d at 451-52.
409
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special relationship exception are not met, the third element-justifi-
able reliance-will also fail.76
Even if a homeowner could establish "direct contact" and "express
assurances," "justifiable reliance" still may not follow under the new
rule. In Meaney, the court indicated that justifiable reliance is to be
measured from the perspective of the governmental entity-that is, the
plaintiff's reliance is justifiable only if the governmental entity
intended to induce reliance.77 If "justifiable reliance" is assessed from
the government's perspective, the government may freely assert it did
not intend contact with the plaintiff to induce reliance."
The denial of a governmental duty in homeowner cases follows from
the new special relationship exception, and is aligned with policy con-
siderations motivating the court to restrict the exception. The court
restricted the rule largely to prevent governmental entities from being
held as insurers against builders' economic losses resulting from the
builders' failure to comply with regulations.79 The same policy rea-
sons apply equally to lawsuits brought by physically injured home-
owners because the duty to ensure compliance with building
regulations is still on the builder, not the governmental entity. A
physically injured homeowner, thus, could probably recover tort dam-
ages only from the builder.80
76. Moreover, homeowners would have difficulty recovering under other exceptions, such as
the "clear legislative intent" exception, because the Washington Supreme Court has held that
state building inspections are intended to benefit the general public, and thus no duty emanates to
individual members of the public. Id. at 164-66, 759 P.2d at 450-5 1. But see Halvorson v. Dahl,
89 Wash. 2d 673, 676-77, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192-93 (1978) (city had an affirmative duty to
individuals under the "clear legislative intent" exception because the housing code showed a
"clear intent" to protect building occupants).
77. "It is only where a direct inquiry is made by an individual and incorrect information is
clearly set forth by the government, the government intends that it be relied upon and it is relied
upon by the individual to his detriment, that the government may be bound." Meaney v. Dodd,
I11 Wash. 2d 174, 180, 759 P.2d 455, 458 (1988) (specifically overruling the rule established by
J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 306, 669 P.2d 468, 472-73 (1983), which
measured justifiable reliance from the plaintiff's perspective).
78. Whether a governmental entity could "freely assert" that it did not intend to induce
justifiable reliance ultimately will depend on which party bears the burden of proving, or
disproving, justifiable reliance.
The court's statement of justifiable reliance in Meaney may hinder implementation of
Washington statutes abrogating governmental immunity by preventing imposition of liability in
situations where a private individual or corporation would be liable. See infra text accompanying
notes 97-102.
79. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 168-69, 759 P.2d at 452.
80. An injured homeowner could base his or her suit against the builder on a negligence
theory. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 104A, at 722 (W. Keeton 5th ed.
1984).
410
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In cases involving physically injured homeowners, the new special
relationship rule and a traditional tort duty analysis will produce the
same result, but the tort analysis provides a more reliable process for
reaching that result. The same result would be reached under a tradi-
tional tort duty analysis because the party responsible for building
code compliance, the builder, is in the best position to foresee and
avoid possible injury resulting from noncompliance.
A traditional tort duty analysis focuses on foreseeability of injury
and proximate cause.81 In contrast, the elements of the new special
relationship rule do not directly consider foreseeability or ability to
avoid injury;82 rather, a mechanical application of the rule happens to
lead to the right result. Also, a traditional tort duty analysis uses the
same standard of care in negligence suits involving government and
private defendants-that of a reasonable person. Thus, a traditional
tort duty analysis allows full compliance with Washington statutes
abrogating governmental immunity by applying the same tort analysis
to both private and government defendants.83
2. Unrelated Third Parties Physically Injured
by Governmental Negligence
Unrelated third parties84 injured by governmental negligence argua-
bly also will be unable to recover from the government under the new
special relationship exception. Recovery will be denied under the new
rule because the elements of the new rule do not reflect policy con-
cerns involved when the plaintiff is an unrelated third party. Instead,
the elements of the new rule stem from a preexisting privity relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the government. A traditional tort duty
analysis supports recovery by allowing the court to consider factors
pertinent to each case.
In Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 the plaintiff's wife was killed after
a city inspector failed to disconnect a dangerous electrical current.
81. Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 292, 669 P.2d 451, 461 (1983)
(Utter, J., concurring in the result).
82. It will be foreseeable to governmental entities that some plaintiffs who have been in direct
contact and received express assurances from them would be injured by negligent acts. "Direct
contact" and "express assurances" are not always an accurate measure of foreseeability,
however, since some persons will be foreseeably injured by governmental negligence despite their
inability to establish these two elements. See infra text accompanying notes 84-96.
83. See infra text accompanying note 114.
84. For purposes of this Comment, "unrelated third parties" are persons without a "business-
type" relationship to the governmental entity prior to suffering injury. See infra text
accompanying notes 92-93.
85. 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (plaintiff was able to prove that the defendant owed a
duty under the pre-1988 special relationship rule).
Washington Law Review
The plaintiff had phoned the city electrical inspector about a "hot cur-
rent" running through a creek on the plaintiff's property.8 6 The
inspector found faulty wiring in a neighbor's underwater creek light-
ing and left a notice on the neighbor's door, but failed to shut off the
electricity. 7 The plaintiff's wife was subsequently electrocuted while
trying to pull her son from the creek."8
The plaintiff in Campbell would have difficulty meeting all three ele-
ments of the new special relationship exception. Because the plaintiff
contacted the city about the dangerous condition, the first element,
direct contact, would be met. 9 However, the second element, express
assurances, would fail unless the inspector expressly told the plaintiff
that he or she would rectify the problem. 0 Finally, under the new
special relationship rule, the plaintiff's reliance would not be "justifi-
able" because the inspector did not promise to remedy the dangerous
condition.91
The effect of the new special relationship rule in this case extends
beyond the policy considerations underlying the rule. The court nar-
rowed the exception primarily to prevent economically injured plain-
tiffs from holding governmental entities liable in tort as "insurers"
against the plaintiffs' noncompliance with codes.9 2 The elements of
the new special relationship rule-"direct contact," "express assur-
ances," and "justifiable reliance"-are thus intrinsically related to a
"business" type of plaintiff-government relationship, such as that
involved in a permit application. "Unrelated" plaintiffs will often be
unable to meet the elements of the new special relationship exception
because by definition they lack a "business" relationship with the gov-
ernment. This result is unfortunate because the court probably did not
86. Id. at 3, 530 P.2d at 235.
87. Id. at 3-4, 530 P.2d at 236.
88. Id. at 4, 530 P.2d at 236.
89. J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 307, 669 P.2d 468, 473 (1983) (stating
that the direct contact element was met in Campbell).
90. J & B Development held that a plaintiff could rely upon inherent assurances vested in a
public official. Id. at 306, 669 P.2d at 472-73. Taylor restricted this element to "express," not
"implied," assurances. Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 166-68, 759 P.2d 447,
451-52 (1988).
The court did not make clear in Taylor, Honcoop, or Meaney whether an oral promise from a
government official would meet the "express assurances" requirement, or if the official must be
specifically authorized to give such assurances.
91. To avoid this result a court might attempt to find a statutory duty through the "clear
legislative intent" exception. If, however, a statute or ordinance did not purport to protect a
specified class of people that included the plaintiff's decedent, there would be no recovery from
the government. See supra note 22.
92. Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 168-70, 759 P.2d at 452-53.
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seek to limit physically injured, unrelated third parties from recover-
ing in tort against governmental entities.93
As shown by the Campbell scenario, the new special relationship
rule restricts governmental liability without support from policy con-
siderations other than those raised in Taylor.94 A traditional tort duty
analysis produces a different result-the defendant governmental
entity owes the plaintiff a duty. Duty results if the plaintiff can estab-
lish that injury was foreseeable and the defendant proximately caused
the injury.95 In Campbell, the government agent could best foresee
and prevent the danger of electrocution.96 Traditional tort duty analy-
sis produces a better result because the denial of a duty under the spe-
cial relationship rule lacks substantive justification.
B. The New Special Relationship Exception May Prevent the
Finding of a Duty Mandated by Statute
Many states have abandoned the public duty doctrine because the
doctrine is seen as a revival of governmental immunity.9 7 Because
Washington courts have frequently used exceptions to the public duty
doctrine to permit negligence suits, the public duty doctrine in Wash-
ington prior to 1988 did not bar otherwise valid claims, as would the
doctrine of governmental immunity. However, in some situations the
new special relationship exception will give the government preferen-
tial treatment not afforded private persons. This result contravenes
statutes abrogating governmental immunity, in which the legislature
indicated that governmental tort liability should not be affected by the
defendant's status as a governmental entity.9
8
93. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
95. Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 292, 669 P.2d 451, 461 (1983)
(Utter, J., concurring in the result).
96. Although the plaintiff in Campbell undoubtedly called the electrical inspector because of
the danger he foresaw resulting from the "hot" current, the plaintiff could not legally disconnect
his neighbor's electricity. For a discussion of government police powers and the special
relationship exception, see generally Note, Leake v. Cain: Abrogation of the Public Duty Doctrine
in Colorado?, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 383, 394-99 (1988).
97. See, eg., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Brennen v. City of Eugene,
285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719, 723-25 (1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247
N.W.2d 132, 137-39 (1976) See generally 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 53.04b, at 166 n.14 (3d. ed. rev. 1984); Annotation, Modern Status of Rule
Excusing Governmental Unit from Tort Liability on Theory that Only General, Not Particular,
Duty Was Owed Under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194, 1203-05 (1985).
98. J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 310-11, 669 P.2d 468, 475, (1983)
(Utter, J., concurring in the result); see supra notes 12-13.
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The new special relationship exception may exclude governmental
liability where a private defendant would be held liable. This exclu-
sion is most evident where the plaintiff is an unrelated third party
unable to meet the restrictive requirements of the new special relation-
ship exception.99 The Washington Supreme Court, one year prior to
creating the new rule, expressed concern that the public duty doctrine
and its exceptions possibly run counter to the legislature's intent." °
The court's concern is made even more compelling by the subsequent
restriction of the special relationship exception. In essence, the court
has broadened the impact of the public duty doctrine by restricting the
special relationship rule.'01 With a more narrow and restricted inter-
pretation of the rule, little functional distinction exists between the
public duty doctrine's presumption of "no duty" and governmental
immunity from suit.' °2
Application of a traditional tort duty analysis, in contrast to the
public duty doctrine, would not perpetuate governmental immunity.
Under a traditional tort duty analysis, the same duty analysis would
be applied to both private and government defendants. Thus, a tradi-
tional tort duty analysis would allow courts to fully comply with
Washington statutes by eliminating focus upon the status of the
defendant.
C. The Court Should Abandon the Public Duty Doctrine and
Substitute a Traditional Tort Duty Analysis
The public duty doctrine and the new special relationship exception
inadequately respond to policy considerations essential to negligence
suits between governmental entities and private parties. First, the
public duty doctrine's underlying premise of a general duty to all peo-
ple unnecessarily diverts focus from the real issue-whether the gov-
ernment owes the plaintiff a particularized duty. t°3 Second, a duty
99. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
100. The Washington Supreme Court stated:
In effect, the public duty doctrine places in this court's hands the task of determining as a
matter of 'public policy' when a duty of care exists on the part of public employees. This
raises the difficult question as to whether affording special protection to agents of the
government violates the Legislature's directive, which requires governmental bodies to be
liable in tort 'to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.'
Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 267, 737 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (1987).
101. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976) (public duty doctrine abandoned in
favor of a traditional tort analysis because the public duty doctrine was seen as governmental
immunity in a different guise).
102. Comment, supra note 17, at 537.
103. As Justice Utter noted:
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analysis restricted by the elements of the new special relationship
rule---"direct contact," "express assurances" and "justifiable reli-
ance"-fails to address the fundamental issue of whether the govern-
ment should owe a duty. Finally, application of the new rule may
deny recovery to some plaintiffs because of the defendant's status as a
governmental entity.104
A traditional tort duty analysis provides a better framework for
assessing governmental duty, because a traditional tort duty analysis
promotes consideration of whether the government should owe a duty
in a given situation.105 Policy considerations are implicit within an
analysis of whether the government should owe a duty. 106 Under the
special relationship rule, policy considerations are limited to concerns
involved in permit cases.107 Under a traditional tort duty analysis,
policy considerations stem from the facts of each case.
Justice Utter, a frequent critic of the court's use of the public duty
doctrine, has suggested that the same duty analysis should be applied
to both private and government defendants. 108 When possible, an
analogy should be drawn between similar functions performed in the
private and public sectors. 109 When a governmental entity performs a
unique function not paralleled in the private sector, such as the issu-
ance of permits, courts should focus duty analysis on policy concerns
pertinent to the "unique public function."110
A court applying a traditional tort duty analysis in cases involving
the negligent issuance of a permit would still hold that the builder, and
The basic question is simple: whose duty is it to ensure that construction projects meet the
standards of a local building code, the builder or the government? When we conclude there
is no duty on the part of the County then it follows that the duty of compliance is on the
shoulders of the builder alone.
Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 172-73, 759 P.2d 447, 454 (1988) (Utter, J., con-
curring); see also J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 309, 669 P.2d 468, 474
(1983) (Utter, L, concurring in the result); Note, supra note 27, at 735; Comment, supra note 17,
at 542.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
106. "The concept of duty is a reflection of all those considerations of public policy which
lead the law to conclude that a 'plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant's conduct."' Taylor, 111 Wash. 2d at 168, 759 P.2d at 452 (quoting PROSSER AND
KE TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 357 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
108. J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 310, 669 P.2d at 475 (Utter, J., concurring in the
result).
109. See, eg., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240-41 (Alaska 1976) (governmental duty found
by analogizing a government fire inspector to a private insurance inspector).
110. J & B Dev. Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 311, 669 P.2d at 475 (Utter, J., concurring in the
result).
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not the governmental entity, was responsible for ensuring compliance
with applicable codes and regulations.1"' The builder would retain the
duty of compliance because a consideration of pertinent policy factors
has resulted in a determination that permits simply authorize con-
struction to proceed, and do not ensure against noncompliance. 1 2
Traditional tort duty analysis, unlike the public duty doctrine and
the special relationship exception, also allows the finding of a duty
when the government negligently causes injury to an unrelated third
party. Under a traditional tort duty analysis, an unrelated third party
can recover if the government should owe the plaintiff a duty of rea-
sonable care. Whether the government should owe the plaintiff a duty
depends on factors such as the government's ability to foresee injury,
and its ability to avoid harm." 3 A traditional tort duty analysis allows
unrelated third parties an opportunity to prove the government owed
them a duty. Under the new special relationship rule, the existence of
a duty is prohibited through a mechanical application of a permit-
oriented test.
A traditional tort duty analysis also avoids problems inherent in
using a separate duty analysis for private and government defendants.
Under a traditional tort duty analysis, the same duty analysis applies
to all defendants. Thus, the government's status becomes irrelevant.
By applying the same analysis to private and government defendants,
courts will fully comply with Washington statutes mandating that no
distinction be made between private and government defendants.' "4
Abrogation of the public duty doctrine would not alter analysis
under the other three exceptions to the doctrine. The "clear legislative
intent" and "failure to enforce" exceptions recognize a duty created by
statute." 5 A statutory mandate is the same whether analyzed with or
without the label of "public duty doctrine." The third exception, the
"rescue doctrine," is a restatement of a traditional principle of tort and
similarly applies regardless of the public duty doctrine." 6
A traditional tort duty analysis is a better analytical tool for deter-
mining governmental duty, because under a traditional tort duty anal-
ysis the primary focus is on whether the government should owe a
111. Cf Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 167, 759 P.2d 447, 451-52 (1988).
112. Id.
113. See generally Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 555 P.2d 818, 822
(1976); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 260-61, 407 P.2d 440,
448 (1965).
114. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 22.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965).
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duty. Encompassed within an analysis of whether the government
should owe a duty is an analysis of policy considerations pertinent to
the type of function the government is performing. Finally, a tradi-
tional tort duty analysis allows full compliance with Washington stat-
utes abrogating governmental immunity by applying the same duty
analysis to all defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
In Taylor, Honcoop, and Meaney, the Washington Supreme Court
created an exception to the public duty doctrine that is fraught with
inherent problems. The "direct contact," "express assurances," and
"justifiable reliance" elements of the new special relationship excep-
tion create an unduly narrow rule in cases involving injury to unre-
lated third parties. By limiting the special relationship exception to
situations involving direct contact and express assurances, many unre-
lated third parties face exclusion from recovery merely because they
have no relation to the governmental entity prior to suffering injury.
Because the direct contact, express assurances, and justifiable reliance
elements of the new rule reflect problems limited to permit cases, it
may be easier for permit seekers to meet the requirements of the new
special relationship rule than it will be for unrelated third parties.
Plaintiffs who are economically, rather than physically, injured may
have been able to prevent their losses through compliance with gov-
ernment regulations. Unrelated third parties, on the other hand, have
no such opportunity. In addition, the disparate treatment of private
and government defendants under the new rule arguably violates
Washington statutes abolishing governmental immunity which require
that no distinction be made based on the status of the defendant.
Traditional tort duty analysis provides a better mechanism for
determining governmental duty by focusing on whether the govern-
mental entity should owe a duty given the facts of the case. By apply-
ing a traditional tort duty analysis to government defendants, courts
will use the same duty analysis in cases involving both private and
government defendants, thus complying with Washington statutes.
The Washington Supreme Court should abandon its use of the public
duty doctrine and its exceptions and instead rely on a traditional tort
duty analysis to determine governmental duty.
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